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tulospalkkauksella tarkoitetaan sitä, että yrityksen tuloksen ja työntekijöiden kompensaation välillä 
on selkeä yhteys. Työntekijöiden terveyttä ja turvallisuudentunnetta tutkin niihin liittyvien 
ongelmien kautta, joita ovat muun muassa onnettomuudet, loukkaantumiset ja kuolemat 
työpaikalla.  
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sekä tulospalkkausta että terveyden ja turvallisuuden ongelmia osoitinmuuttujalla. 
Innovatiivisuuden mittareissa seuraan aiempaa kirjallisuutta ja käytän patenttien ja patenttien 
sitaattien lukumäärää sekä niitä skaalattuna tutkimus- ja kehityskuluilla. Käyttämiini 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 
The importance of innovation in companies has gained increased attention in recent years, and 
it is recognized as a necessary corporate strategy that boosts long-term growth and improves 
the competitive edge of a firm. Innovation has become an urgent concern to firms, since the 
lifetime of products has shortened due to an accelerating pace of technological change. Some 
companies, e.g. start-ups, basically live off innovation. Great ideas arise when there are active, 
motivated and committed employees in a company. These ideas generate into new products, 
services and business models, which is what innovation is all about. Because of the clear 
relationship between innovation and growth among firms, CEOs and researchers have been 
eager to examine factors that could lead the companies to be more innovative. 
Manso (2011) argues that standard pay-for-performance schemes are not enough to incite 
innovation because they punish failures with low rewards. Since innovation involves 
intrinsically a high risk of failure, an optimal incentive to innovate should tolerate early failure 
and reward for long-term success. He also emphasizes the importance of factors like 
commitment to a long-term compensation plan, timely feedback on performance and job 
security in order to drive innovation. He states valid executive incentives as for example stock 
options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes and managerial 
entrenchment.  
In real life, ideas typically do not originate from managers but from employees working in the 
company’s bench level. These employees have a cutting edge when it comes to innovation in 
the company, as they work in areas close to the firm’s own technology and interact contiguously 
with the customers and thus get important information of their needs and wishes. Harden et al. 
(2008) state that the idea of isolated R&D scientists working in laboratories is outdated as 
today’s organizations value the ideas and insights of employees at all levels of the organization. 
Rudis (2004) reports that according to CEO surveys, one of the greatest concerns in companies 
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is stimulating innovation and creativity among employees. Still most of the previous empirical 
work has considered only executive incentives, leaving non-executive incentives without much 
attention.  
1.2 Motivation and research objectives 
 
Since the major role of rank-and-file employees as innovators in today’s companies is 
established, I find it important to examine which non-executive incentives are effective in 
stimulating corporate innovation. In this thesis, I empirically study the role of profit sharing 
programs that are targeted to the majority of a firm’s employees. My study adds to prior 
literature on non-executive incentives for innovation, such as stock options and bonuses, and is 
the first to examine the effect of profit sharing on innovation in U.S. companies. I am also 
interested in studying the effect of non-financial innovation incentives, as I believe that factors 
like job satisfaction, employee commitment and welfare are important drivers of innovation 
activity in companies. This area is very understudied in the prior innovation literature. Thus I 
examine how health and safety concerns, which affect the whole work force, in a firm impact 
its innovativeness.  
My first hypothesis is that firms with a profit sharing program are more innovative than firms 
with no profit sharing program. My second hypothesis is that firms with health and safety 
concerns are less innovative than firms with no health and safety concerns. To test the effect of 
profit sharing, I use a dummy variable that reveals if a firm has a profit sharing scheme or not. 
Considering the second hypothesis, I use a dummy variable that captures several serious health 
and safety concerns a firm can face.  
1.3 Main findings and limitations 
 
My data set combines data from NBER Patent and Citation Database, MSCI ESG KLD STATS 
database and Compustat. The final sample consists of 2,686 observations between 1995 and 
2003. I find a positive and significant effect of profit sharing programs on corporate innovation, 
measured by patents, patent citations and them scaled by R&D expenses. I also find a negative 
and significant effect of health and safety concerns on the innovation measures. My results are 
robust to the use of negative binomial regressions instead of standard OLS regressions. 
However, I do not find significant results when using R&D expenses scaled by assets as 
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innovation measure. In additional research, I find that the effects of profit sharing and health 
and safety concerns on innovation are more pronounced in those firms, where the input of non-
executive employees is stronger. Additionally, I test if the effects are larger in firms with less 
free-riding, but I do not find any significant differences. I also examine closer those firms in 
the sample that have experienced a change in the use of profit sharing in some year(s). I do not 
find that the firms would have been more innovative in those years when profit sharing was in 
use. 
It is possible that my results suffer from endogeneity issues: omitted variables or reverse 
causality. In addition, the results concerning health and safety concerns may suffer from small 
sample bias. My data consists of U.S. firms, and the results are not necessarily applicable to 
other areas. 
1.4 Structure 
 
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide a review of the relevant 
literature on corporate innovation, profit sharing and employee health and safety, and state 
theoretical arguments for the hypotheses. In Section 3, I state the research question and 
introduce the data, sample and summary statistics. In Section 4, I present and discuss the 
empirical results of the baseline models. I also show alternative models with negative binomial 
regressions instead of OLS regressions and R&D expenses as innovation measure, and discuss 
possible endogeneity issues. In Section 5, I conduct some further research by studying firms 
that have changing status of profit sharing, and dividing the sample based on the effect of 
employee importance and free-riding among employees. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature review and theoretical arguments  
 
I examine the effects of profit sharing and employee health and safety on corporate innovation, 
and thus the related literature can be divided into three parts: profit sharing, health and safety 
and innovation. First, I introduce some general notions about corporate innovation, after which 
I present literature on innovation incentives. Then I continue with literature related to profit 
sharing programs and employee health and safety. Finally, I propound theoretical arguments 
based on prior literature both against and in favour of my hypotheses. 
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2.1 Corporate innovation 
 
The Solow growth model implies that capital accumulation is not the main driver of long-run 
growth. Instead, the theory suggests that technological change, and therefore innovation, is the 
key factor to ensure and strengthen long-term economic growth and competitive advantage of 
countries (Solow, 1957), and the same holds for organizations (Baregheh et al., 2009). The 
enhancement of innovation represents an increasingly central problem for firm survival and 
competitiveness. Therefore, the topic is of interest to researchers, and the related literature is 
extensive.  
Though the link between innovation and economic growth has long been recognized, the views 
have shifted radically from the early neo-classical approaches, which perceived knowledge and 
technology as completely exogenous to the system. It was seen that the same technological 
opportunities were equally available to individuals and firms in all places, and that in the long 
term the pace of technological progress would be the same everywhere. (Howells, 2005) Joseph 
Schumpeter (1883-1950) was among the first economists to identify the essentialness of 
innovation. He constructed a theory of economic development, where the innovation process is 
one of the three key elements of economic growth (Ruttan, 1959). In his theory, change and 
economic progress are correlative, and entrepreneurship is the driving force. The entrepreneur 
contributes by introducing new production methods and products, expanding markets and novel 
management techniques. As a result of successful innovation, the entrepreneur achieves 
entrepreneurial profit, and the economy as a whole benefits from technological progress. This 
leads to economic development.  
Defining innovation is challenging, as the word is not rigorously defined but has a number of 
meanings. Based on a content analysis, Baregheh et al. (2009) suggest a generic definition of 
innovation: “Innovation is the multi‐stage process whereby organizations transform ideas into 
new or improved products, services or processes, in order to advance, compete and differentiate 
themselves successfully in their marketplace.” Smith (2005) offers a shorter definition, stating 
that innovation is novelty: the creation of something new. The Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) 
defines innovation as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or 
service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business 
practices, workplace organization or external relations.” All of these definitions associate 
innovation with something new.  
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To understand innovation, it is helpful to differentiate innovation and invention. Invention 
fundamentally means coming up with new ideas, while for being an innovation, those ideas 
need to be brought to the market. Fagerberg (2005) notes that while inventions can be made 
anywhere, innovations are mostly made in corporations. Schumpeter has argued that “as long 
as they are not carried into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant.” (Scherer, 1986) 
To turn an invention into an innovation, the firm needs to combine multiple factors: knowledge, 
capabilities and resources. Kline and Rosenberg (2010) state that successful innovation requires 
balancing the demands of the new product and its manufacturing processes and the market 
needs, as well as maintaining an organization that supports the innovation process effectively. 
Scherer (1986) notes that once the necessary inventions are available, reaching the innovation 
stage relies strongly on the human and material resources, as well as the firm’s ability to tolerate 
costly and time-consuming trials and errors.  
Thinking of innovation as just new products is a mistake. There are at least five different types 
of innovation: new products, new methods of production, new sources of supply, the 
exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize business (Fagerberg, 2005). Holmstrom 
(1989) denotes that the innovation process is long, idiosyncratic, and unpredictable, and does 
not follow a linear model. Due to the multidimensional novelty involved in the innovation 
process, there is no general way of measuring the importance or impact of innovation (Smith, 
2005). Also Acs et al. (2002) admit that the measurement of economically useful new 
knowledge is problematic. However, they show empirical evidence suggesting that patents 
provide a fairly reliable, although not perfect, measure of innovative activity. Nagaoka et al. 
(2010) add that information on patent citations (the number of times a patent is cited in other 
patents) provide very useful information on the value of patents and therefore on the value of 
innovation.  
Baregheh et al. (2009) underline the importance of corporate innovation as a response to 
persistently changing customer demands, and as a way to utilize opportunities offered by 
technology and changing marketplaces, structures and dynamics. Firms seem to understand the 
worth of innovation, as Guiso et al. (2015) notice that 80% of the Standard and Poor's 500 
companies advertise innovation as a part of their company values. Given the value of innovation 
for a company to survive, it is a priority to examine the factors that determine incentives to 
innovate. 
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2.2 Incentives to innovate 
 
A central characteristic of innovation is uncertainty, deriving from a very high probability of 
failure (Holmstrom, 1989). Since innovation is defined as the creation of something new, the 
process ineluctably contains elements that are not comprehended in the beginning (Kline and 
Rosenberg, 2010). Holmstrom (1989) and Manso (2011) suggest that a valid innovation 
incentive tolerates early failure and concentrates on rewarding long-term success. Chang et al. 
(2013) complement the theory by showing that conservative accounting, which relies on 
managerial myopia, results in decreased tolerance for early failures and hampers innovation. 
Tian and Wang (2014) find that Initial Public Offering (IPO) firms backed by more failure-
tolerant venture capital investors are significantly more innovative, and failure tolerance is 
especially important for ventures that are subject to high failure risk. Acharya et al. (2009) show 
that labour laws that do not punish short-run failures of employees spur corporate innovation. 
Xuan Tian has been involved in multiple studies considering corporate innovation, and one 
important theme in his studies has been the relation between various stock market 
characteristics and firms' incentives to engage in innovative activities. A study from 2012 (He 
and Tian) shows that firms covered by a large number of analysts generate less corporate 
innovation, which is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts pressure managers to meet 
short-term goals, hindering firms' investments in long-term innovative projects. Another study 
(Fang et al., 2014) points out that an increase in stock liquidity causes a reduction in future 
innovation. The possible reasons are the increased exposure to hostile takeovers, which can 
pressure managers to cut long-term intangible investments such as innovation, and higher 
presence of institutional investors, who may pressure the management to cut innovation 
investments and concentrate on short-term earnings. On the other hand, Aghion et al. (2013) 
argue that greater institutional ownership actually enhances innovation, because CEOs in these 
firms are less likely to be fired even after poor company performance, which reduces 
managerial myopia.  
Blanco and Wehrheim (2017) find that firms with more options trading activity obtain more 
patents and patent citations scaled with R&D expenses. They argue that this derives from the 
enhanced informational efficiency caused by options, which leads to an improved allocation of 
corporate resources into innovation activities. Acharya and Xu (2017) show that public firms 
in external finance dependent industries (but not in internal finance dependent industries) spend 
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more on R&D and achieve a better patent portfolio than their private counterparts, indicating 
that the effect of public listing on innovation depends on the demand for external capital. 
Ferreira et al. (2012) argue that since private firms are less transparent to outside investors than 
public firms, they are more tolerant of failure and thus invest more in innovative projects. 
Balsmeier et al. (2017) have studied the role of independent boards on innovation. They find 
that firms that undergo a transition to more independent boards apply for more patents and 
receive more total future citations to their patents. 
The existing literature on how managers’ characteristics affect corporate innovation includes 
the study of Hirshleifer et al. (2012). They find that overconfident CEOs invest more in 
innovation and achieve greater innovative success, because overconfident managers accept 
greater risk. However, the effects of overconfidence on innovation are mainly found in 
innovative industries, suggesting that the benefits of overconfidence are mostly pronounced in 
firms that have strong internal innovative opportunities. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) use proxies for 
CEO overconfidence based on options exercise and press coverage. Sunder et al. (2017) 
continue the theme by finding that firms led by pilot CEOs generate greater innovation success. 
They use CEOs’ hobby of flying small aircraft as a proxy for sensation seeking, which combines 
personal risk taking and desire to pursue novel experiences. They argue that in addition to 
overconfidence, sensation seeking is a personality trait that can be used to identify CEOs who 
are likely to drive innovation success. Barker and Mueller (2002) have studied the effect of 
various CEO characteristics on R&D spending. They find that firms spend more on R&D when 
CEOs are younger, invest more in firm stock, have significant career experience in marketing 
or engineering, and hold advanced science-related degrees. 
Considering executive incentives, Lerner and Wulf (2007) find that higher compensation levels 
for the corporate R&D head are associated with more patent awards, more heavily cited patents 
and more concentrated patents in firms with centralized R&D organizations. However, their 
results do not hold for firms with decentralized R&D organization. Balkin et al. (2000) show 
that within high-technology firms, the firm’s capability to innovate and CEO pay are related. 
They find a strong relationship between short-term CEO pay (base salary and bonus tied to 
performance objectives of one year or less) and innovation, but for long term-term pay (equity-
based compensation such as stock options) the results are less consistent. Francis et al. (2011) 
find that stock options granted to corporate executives as well as golden parachutes have a 
positive effect on innovation output. Holthausen et al. (1995) find modest evidence that the 
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structure of compensation for the divisional CEO lead to more innovative activity within the 
division.  
Most of the previous studies of innovation incentives consider managerial incentives, while 
non-executive incentives, which I focus on, remain as a more underexplored topic. Some 
contributors to the topic are for instance Baccara and Razin (2009), who argue that an 
innovation bonus encourages employees to bring up their ideas and leads to innovation. Chang 
et al. (2015) find that non-executive employee stock options have a positive effect on innovation 
output through enhancing employees' risk-taking incentives. Their study highlights the role of 
rank-and-file employees as important innovators for companies. Sims (2003) notes that some 
companies pay high bonuses to the employees responsible for innovations in order to enhance 
innovation, but this approach may only provide short-term benefits without taking into account 
the long-term implications. 
In addition to incentives, there is some literature on the barriers to innovation. Galia and Legros 
(2004) find that among postponed projects, the most important obstacles for firms are economic 
risk and the shortage of qualified personnel. For firms that abandoned innovative projects, the 
reasons were mainly due to excessive economic risk and high expenses of innovation. 
Mukherjee et al. (2017) show that higher state-level corporate taxes hamper innovator 
incentives and reduce willingness to take risks. Savignac (2008) find that financial constraints 
significantly hamper the likelihood that firms engage in innovative activities. Mohnen et al. 
(2008) continue that financial constraints decrease innovative activity even if the country’s tax 
treatment of R&D is favourable to innovations, there are programs that support small innovative 
firms or the venture capital sector has recently experienced a significant growth. D’Este et al. 
(2012) recognise two different types of obstacles firms may face when undertaking innovation 
activity: revealed and deterred effects of barriers. Revealed barriers reflect the difficultness of 
the innovation process and the learning experience, and deterring barriers cover the obstacles 
that prevent firms from engaging in innovation activity. 
2.3 Profit sharing 
 
Profit sharing refers to a plan that aims to share a direct stake of company profits with its 
employees. The definition is broad, since there are multiple variations of how profit sharing can 
be executed. For example, the percentage of profits divided to employees can be fixed or vary 
depending on certain factors. Profit sharing is not a new invention, as it has existed for decades 
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as a way to tie employees’ salaries to company profits. The early support for profit sharing was 
mostly ideological, as many proponents saw profit sharing as a way to integrate workers into 
the capitalist system in a more direct and tangible way than with fixed wages. Profit sharing 
could also be seen as a logical extension of political democracy. Nowadays the support for 
profit sharing is based more on economic reasons. The underlying argument is that profit 
sharing can motivate employees to work harder and thus increase the productivity of the whole 
company. (Kruse, 1993)  
The literature on profit sharing consists mostly of its impact on various firm characteristics. 
Pêrotin and Robinson (2002) argue that profit sharing can increase the firm’s demand for labour 
and its level of employment by increasing productivity and by decreasing the marginal cost of 
labour. Kraft and Ugarkovic (2006) show a positive correlation between profit sharing and 
profitability in German companies. Wilson and Peel (1991) show that firms with participation 
schemes such as profit sharing had significantly lower absenteeism and quit rates than firms 
without such schemes. The most examined variable is however productivity, and Pêrotin and 
Robinson (2002) summarize the many studies as follows: “There is remarkable agreement 
across studies from more than 20 countries covering several tens of thousands of enterprises 
that financial participation has a positive or neutral effect on productivity.” 
The prior research about the relation between profit sharing and innovation is limited, and the 
definition of both profit sharing and innovation varies, making it difficult to derive conclusive 
evidence. Kanama and Nishikawa (2017) find evidence that Japanese companies with a 
performance-based evaluation system based on R&D performance are more likely to develop 
new products and services and achieve greater technological superiority. However, they also 
argue that for large Japanese companies, monetary compensation has a negative impact on the 
development of new products and services. The reason might be that employees see the 
distribution of resources as a zero-sum game and lose the motivation to collaborate, and thus 
innovate, with their colleagues. The study concludes that for achieving better innovation results, 
it is more desirable to build an evaluation system that reflects research performance rather than 
just introducing a compensation system.  
The study “Profit sharing and innovation” by Aerts et al. (2015) is closely linked to my thesis, 
but they have a different approach to the subject. The main finding is that profit sharing fosters 
product innovation but has no effect on process innovation. Their study differs from my study, 
as their data consist of survey data on German companies (I use U.S. companies) and they 
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gauge innovation by new processes and products developed in the company, which they 
measure with several indicators (I use patents, patent citations and R&D expenses). Despite the 
different approach, the studies are consistent with each other as both find a positive effect of 
profit sharing on corporate innovation. To the best of my knowledge, no other studies have 
examined the impact of profit sharing on the innovative performance of companies.  
2.4 Employee health and safety  
 
The importance of well-being, health and safety at work has raised growing interest, as it is 
recognized that an employee’s physical, emotional, mental and social experiences in the 
workplace affect the person’s productivity and ability to work (Danna and Griffin, 1999). Baker 
and Green (1991) note that the changes in attitudes are significant, as at the beginning of the 
industrial revolution employees were mostly viewed as interchangeable gears in a production 
machine. Now more importance is placed on understanding and promoting employee health. 
Boyd (1997) states that overstressed workers may respond to poor health and well-being with 
illegal or unethical activities, such as making lower quality decisions, covering up incidents at 
workplace, and lying to customers. 
The growing awareness of employee safety and health concerns has led to the development of 
a wide range of health promotion programs and programs which aim to improve the safety of 
the workplace. Wolfe et al. (1994) define employee health management programs (EHMPs) as 
long-term organizational activities, which promote the adoption of personal behaviors that 
improve employee health. Employee health components are for example exercise, stress 
management, accident prevention and health risk evaluation. Conrad (1988) states that the 
outcomes of such programs have been improved employee health and fitness, decreased 
medical costs and absenteeism, improved morale and job satisfaction, increased production, 
and a better corporate image. Wolfe et al. (1994) add that EHMPs have been found to enhance 
job performance and company turnover, but they remark that it is often difficult to differentiate 
the effect of EMPHs from for example employees’ personality or attitudinal factors.  
Health and safety in the workplace can be seen to be part of two more common concepts: 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate culture. There are several definitions of 
these concepts. Corporate culture is a set of norms and values shared in an organization. They 
define the rules and context for social interaction and communication in the workplace. 
(O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996) Kotter (2008) defines that in a strong corporate culture, all 
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managers and employees share similar values and methods of doing business. Strong cultures 
enhance the level of motivation among employees and avoid suffocating formal bureaucracy 
that can hamper motivation and innovation. The annual Great Place to Work® survey strives 
to assess a company’s culture with two data sets: the Culture Audit Survey© and the Trust 
Index© employee survey. The latter captures employees' level of trust towards management, 
and one variable included is safety, which is assessed by asking employees if they feel that their 
workplace is a physically safe place to work in. 
Abagail (2015) explains that CSR covers actions of firms that contribute to social welfare and 
go beyond what is required for profit maximization. He continues that as consumers and 
investors have developed a clear preference for socially responsible firms, companies have in 
general responded positively and developed their CSR skills. MSCI ESG KLD STATS is an 
annual dataset that gathers social performance indicators of U.S. firms, and they use several 
dimensions that can be seen as determinants of the quality of firm CSR: community, human 
rights, employee relations (including health and safety), product quality and safety, diversity, 
governance, and controversial business involvement (for example alcohol, tobacco and 
firearms). Asongu (2007) notes that not only is society expecting companies to be good 
corporate citizens, it is also becoming less and less tolerant of companies that fail to address 
their social responsibilities.  
Guiso et al. (2015) examine which dimensions of corporate culture affect firm profitability. 
They find that a culture of integrity and trust correlates positively with financial performance. 
Kotter (2008) introduces four studies, in which were found that a corporate culture that 
emphasizes key managerial stakeholders (customers, owners and employees) can have a 
significant impact on a company’s long-term economic performance. Rashid et al. (2003) find 
a significant correlation between corporate culture and organisational commitment and loyalty 
in Malaysian companies, and that both of these factors have an impact on profitability measures.  
Many studies have examined the link between CSR and financial performance. The variation 
in results is high, mostly since the measurement of CSR is difficult. Those arguing for a negative 
relationship suggest that firms performing responsibly cause a competitive disadvantage due to 
incurring costs that might otherwise be avoided (Waddock, 1997). A number of studies (e.g. 
Aupperle, 1985) find a neutral relationship between CSR and financial performance, so that 
there is no positive nor negative relationship. The supporters of non-existing correlation argue 
that due to several intervening variables between social and financial performance, there is no 
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reason to expect a relationship to exist. Some studies find a positive relationship between CSR 
and financial performance, which is supported by the view that the costs are minimal while the 
potential benefits are great. For example, an enlightened employee relations policy may cost 
very little, but can result in increase in morale and productivity and thus add competitive 
advantage in comparison to less responsible firms. (Waddock, 1997) 
To the best of my knowledge, no studies have examined the impact of employees’ health and 
safety on corporate innovation. However, Tellis et al. (2009) examine the relationship between 
internal corporate culture and radical innovation across nations. They argue that the corporate 
culture in some innovative firms (for example Samsung in Korea and Infosys in India) build up 
precisely to overcome barriers of their home economies that would otherwise hinder radical 
innovation.  
2.5 Theoretical arguments  
 
There are some arguments why the effect of profit sharing on corporate innovation may be non-
existent. Several previous studies (e.g. Kohn, 1993) suggest that pay for performance incentives 
work well for encouraging something that has succeeded in the past, but not for tasks which 
require creativity and innovation. Such incentives do not encourage early failure, which is a key 
factor for a valid innovation incentive (Holmstrom, 1989). As Ederer and Manso (2013) 
emphasize, the performance-based financial incentive needs to be specially structured, so that 
it tolerates early failure and rewards long-term success in order to stimulate innovation. 
According to these statements, the positive correlation between profit sharing and innovation 
is questionable as the nature of profit sharing fits better standard performance pay than the latter 
description. 
Chang et al. (2015) find a positive effect of stock options on corporate innovation, and stock 
options and profit sharing are both key employee compensation tools. Nevertheless, the 
incentive period of stock options is longer. For instance Lerner and Wulf (2007) find a clear 
relationship between long-term incentives and innovation, but no relation when it comes to 
short-term incentives.1 Thus positive correlation between stock options and corporate 
innovation does not necessary hold for profit sharing and innovation. Also Pêrotin and 
                                                          
1 Lerner and Wulf (2007) define long-term incentives as equity-based pay like stock options and restricted 
stock. Short-term incentives they define as for example bonus plans that are linked to annual performance. 
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Robinson (2002) suggest that the benefits of cash schemes are more short-term than with 
deferred or share based schemes.  
Though the incentive period of profit sharing is short, it is reasonable to argue that it has a 
stimulating effect on employees’ incentives to actively support and contribute to the firm’s 
innovation activities. Aerts et al. (2015) point out that profit sharing leads the company owners 
and employees to share a mutual interest: profit maximization. Since innovations are expected 
to increase the firm’s future profits, they benefit both parties. When employees get their share 
of any profit increase, they probably are more eager to invest in the innovative performance of 
the firm and share their ideas with the management. Ederer (2009) find that innovation 
performance is highest when employees receive a group incentive that rewards long-term joint 
success, making a shared compensation system such as profit sharing potentially a valid 
innovation incentive. As Smith (2005) argues, innovation relies on collaboration and interactive 
learning, and incentives that enhance teamwork lead to more successful innovations. 
Theoretical arguments available for innovation incentives consider mostly financial incentives, 
which employee health and safety are not. However, non-financial incentives may motivate and 
engage employees as efficiently as financial incentives. Baccara and Razin (2009) point out 
that there is a risk that innovative employees leave the firm to build new enterprises with the 
knowledge they acquire, which increases the need for an incentive strong enough to keep the 
employees in the firm. If there are no problems with health and safety in the workplace, job 
satisfaction is likely to be higher, making employees more committed.  
Corporate culture has an influence on the firm’s innovativeness. For example, Büschgens et al. 
(2013) comment that hierarchical cultures that emphasize control are less likely to be 
innovative. Baccara and Razin (2009) note that firms can actively promote creativity through 
intra-firm practices, such as advanced cross-department communication. Especially the flexible 
and knowledge-based corporate culture of the Silicon Valley firms has raised much attention 
as an innovation driver. These companies rely on corporate culture that emphasizes informality, 
minimization of hierarchy and orientation toward entrepreneurial achievement (Saxenian and 
Hsu, 2001). I argue that also employee health and safety is an integral part of the corporate 
culture, and should thus have an impact on innovation.  
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3 Research questions and data  
 
3.1 Research questions 
 
This paper addresses the impacts of profit sharing programs and health and safety concerns on 
corporate innovation. The two hypotheses are stated as follows:  
H1: Firms with a profit sharing program are more innovative than firms with no profit sharing 
program. 
H2: Firms with health and safety concerns are less innovative than firms with no health and 
safety concerns. 
My sample consists of U.S. firms, so the results may not be consistent elsewhere. The question 
is economically of importance, as innovativeness is a key driver of firm growth. Profit sharing 
programs are targeted to the majority of the employees, and different health and safety concerns 
affect the whole work community. Thus the study regards also the stakeholder theory of 
corporate finance, as it examines the importance of non-executive employees in corporate 
innovation.  
3.2 Data on profit sharing  
 
Because of the importance of rank-and-file employees as innovators, I study the effect of profit 
sharing programs which target the majority of the work force – not just the top management. A 
profit sharing program occurs in a firm, when there is a clear link between the profit of the 
company and the employee compensation in a given period. Kruse (1996) summarizes the goals 
of implementing a profit sharing program in a firm: to 1) enhance workplace productivity and 
co-operation, 2) increase compensation flexibility, and 3) discourage unionization and tax 
incentives. In this thesis I examine whether the first goal succeeds, also if profit sharing 
increases corporate innovation alongside productivity.  
I have obtained data on profit sharing from the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database, which 
provides social research data related to corporate social responsibility. MSCI collects data on 
whether a company has a profit sharing program or not. The criteria for having a profit sharing 
program are that the company has recently made distributions as a result of the program, and 
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that a majority of a workforce participates in it. The database provides data from 1995 onwards. 
New companies are added to and inactive companies are dropped from the sample every year, 
resulting in an unbalanced panel structure.  
3.3 Data on health and safety 
 
Asongu (2007) notes that in order to a company to identify innovation opportunities, the 
corporate culture needs to make such identification a priority. He continues that while CSR has 
been recognized to be relevant to a company’s profitability in recent years, the effect on 
innovation is less examined, yet existing. Managing health and safety in a workplace can be 
seen to be part of corporate culture and CSR, which makes me interested to examine if there is 
a correlation between corporate innovation and employee health and safety. 
The MSCI ESG KLD STATS database offers data on the health and safety of a firm’s 
employees. MSCI provides a variable that indicates companies with strong employee health 
and safety programs, but only from 2003 onwards. Thus I use a variable that records the severity 
of controversies related to the health and safety of a firm’s employees, and examine if these 
issues have a negative effect on corporate innovation. Topics covered in health and safety 
concerns include, for example, workplace accidents, injuries, and fatalities, mental health 
issues, as well as kidnappings and physical harm experienced by employees in the field. The 
variable is available from 1995 onwards and results in an unbalanced panel structure.  
3.4 Measuring corporate innovation  
 
To measure innovation output, I follow earlier studies (e.g. Chang et al., 2015 and Acharya et 
al., 2009) and use a combination of the number of patents and the number of patent citations. 
In addition I scale them with R&D expenses. The first measure of innovation, patents, indicates 
the number of patents applied for by a firm in a given year. However, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) 
point out that patents differ greatly in their importance, so I use citations as the second measure 
of innovation. The variable indicates the number of citations received by the firm’s patents and 
therefore represents the quality and importance of the patents.  
The citation data suffers from truncation bias due to the finite length of the patent data. Patents 
in the later years have less time to accumulate citations, which is a problem because patents 
receive citations for a long period of time (Chang et al., 2015). I have addressed this issue by 
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adjusting each patent’s raw citation count by multiplying it with the weighting index provided 
by Hall et al. (2005). The third and fourth measure of innovation is patents/R&D expenses and 
citations/R&D expenses, which indicate how productive the use of R&D expenses has been in 
terms of patents and citations. Patents and citations are measured as a sum of years t+1 and t+2 
in the regressions, while the other variables are measured at year t. 
The data on patents and citations is obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Patent and Citation Database, which provides information on all U.S. patents granted 
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1976 and 2006. There is, on 
average, a two-year lag between the date when inventors file for patents (the application date) 
and the date when patents are granted by USPTO and added to the dataset. Since the last year 
in the NBER dataset is 2006, patents applied for in 2004 and 2005 may not be completely 
covered by the database. As suggested by Hall et al. (2001), I end the sample period in 2003 to 
avoid the issue. Also, when counting patents, I use the application year rather than the grant 
year since Hall et al. (2001) note that the application date is more relevant and closer to the 
actual time of invention. Following Hirshleifer et al. (2012), I exclude firms in financial and 
utility industries (SIC codes: 6000–6999 and 4900–4999, respectively), but this affected only a 
few observations in my data. 
3.5 Control variables 
 
Following the innovation literature, I control for various firm characteristics that may be 
determinants of corporate innovation. To conduct these control variables, I use financial data 
which I have obtained from the Compustat files. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) state that large and 
capital-intensive firms generate more patents, and thus I control for firm size by using the 
natural log of total revenue. I also use the number of employees to control the size effect, 
following Veugelers and Cassiman (1999). My results are robust to the use of total assets as a 
proxy for firm size. I follow Chang et al. (2015) and use R&D/assets to control for tangible 
input to innovation, the log of the net Property, Plant, and Equipment scaled by the number of 
employees to account for capital intensity, and the log of net sales scaled by the number of 
employees to capture labour productivity and quality. The cash-to-assets ratio is used to control 
for the effects of cash holdings. Following Balsmeier et al. (2017), I account for financial 
constraints using capital expenditures scaled by total assets. Chang et al. (2015) find that non-
executive employee stock options have a positive effect on corporate innovation. Therefore I 
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use a control variable called employee involvement, which identifies companies that have 
generous employee stock ownership plans or employee stock purchase plans. I also control for 
year and industry fixed effects. Year fixed effects neutralize the impact of certain events in a 
given year, and industry fixed effects filter out unobserved time-invariant characteristics of 
industries. 
Additionally, I use the Compustat Executive Compensation database, from which I have 
obtained data on options and shares received by all firm’s directors. I have combined these 
figures to one variable, executive compensation, since for example Francis et al. (2011) show 
a positive correlation between executive stock options and innovation. Compustat Executive 
Compensation also provides the variable return on assets (ROA), which I use to control for 
operating profitability. All control variables are measured at year t in the regressions. 
3.6 Final sample and descriptive statistics 
 
In conclusion, the sample construction occurred as follows. I started with all firms included in 
the MSCI database on profit sharing programs and health and safety concerns between 1995 
and 2003. Then I merged the dataset with the NBER Patent and Citation Database and excluded 
firms which had no patent information in any year in the entire database. The combined dataset 
was then merged with Compustat data on control variables described in the previous section. 
At this point there were altogether 4,787 observations. Next, I excluded all firms which had 
zero R&D expenses or provided no such information (this step caused the biggest decrease in 
the sample, dropping to 3,067). I also dropped financial firms and utilities and firm-years with 
missing values for control variables. After these demarcations, I ended up with a final sample 
of 2,686 observations between 1995 and 2003.  
Columns 1–3 of Table 1 report means, medians and standard deviations, respectively, of the 
variables used in the final sample. Considering the corporate innovation measures, an average 
firm in the sample applies for circa 174 patents in two years, and receives 2,269 citations in two 
years. However, the median 20 for patents and median 83 for citations reveal the high skewness 
of the patent and citation distributions. Some 15% of the observations have zero patents in two 
years. I deal with this problem by taking a logarithm of one plus patents and one plus citations 
and use these logarithms as dependent variables in the regressions. Logarithm transformations 
are a common procedure to make positively skewed distributions more normal, and the amounts 
of patents and citations need to be summed with one due to the observations with value zero. 
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For the third (fourth) innovation measure, patents/R&D (citations/R&D), the mean is 0.59 
(6.74) and the median is 0.27 (1.05). Also these variables are clearly skewed, so I take a 
logarithm of one plus these variables when I use them as dependent variables.  
The mean for profit sharing indicates that 19% of the sample firms have a profit sharing 
program, while the remaining 81% have not. Aerts et al. (2015) state that the relatively low 
ratio of firms adapting profit sharing programs is caused by firm-specific advantages or 
disadvantages in respect to different incentive schemes. For example, firms with highly 
structured work tasks probably find e.g. piece rates a better reward system than profit sharing. 
It could also be difficult to employ a profit sharing program which is targeted to the majority 
of the workforce, if the employees exhibit very different qualification levels. The mean for 
health and safety concerns tells that only 4% of the sample firms have these kinds of issues. 
This seems rational, as the concerns indicated by this variable are quite severe. However, the 
small number of firms facing these problems in my sample can lead to small sample bias when 
studying the effect of health and safety concerns.  
The means, medians and standard errors of the control variables reported in columns 1-3 in 
Table 1 reveal the fundamentals of the characteristics of the firms in the whole sample. Notable 
is that the sample firms are relatively big with the mean (median) of 28,000 (10,000) employees, 
compared to the mean (median) of 7,000 (400) for all Compustat firms in 2003. Considering 
revenue, the mean (median) is $8 billion ($2 billion) for the sample firms, compared to the 
mean (median) of $2 billion ($0.9 billion) for all Compustat firms in 2003.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. Number of Patents is the sum of patents in years t+1 and t+2. 
Number of Citations is the sum of patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using the weighting 
index of Hall et al. (2005). Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) in years t+1 
and t+2 scaled by R&D expenses in millions in year t. All following variables are reported in year t and in U.S. 
dollars, if applicable. Profit sharing tells if a given firm has a profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). 
Health and Safety Concern indicates if a given firm has health and safety concerns or not (dummy variable). 
Employee Involvement tells if a given firm has generous employee stock ownership plans or employee stock 
purchase plans or neither (dummy variable). Assets represents the value of total assets of a given firm in millions. 
Revenue is the total net sales in millions. Number of Employees is reported in thousands. Executive Compensation 
is the sum of options and shares received by all directors in thousands. ROA is Return on Assets. R&D/Assets is 
the firm’s R&D expenses scaled by total assets. PPE/#employees is net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) in 
millions scaled by the number of employees in thousands. Revenue/#employees is revenue scaled by the number 
of employees in thousands. Cash/Assets is cash-to-assets ratio. Capital Expenditures/Assets is capital expenditures 
scaled by total assets. 
        
  Whole sample  
  n = 2,686  
    
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
Number of Patents 173.95 20.00 532.90 
Number of Citations 2269.13 82.87 9580.97 
Patents/R&D 0.59 0.27 1.01 
Citations/R&D 6.74 1.05 21.58 
Profit Sharing 0.19 0.00 0.39 
Health and Safety Concerns 0.04 0.00 0.20 
Employee Involvement 0.23 0.00 0.42 
Assets 10609.66 2452.39 37710.89 
Revenue 7928.31 2141.39 19547.29 
Number of Employees 28.08 10.14 54.41 
Excecutive Compensation 5.21 2.40 8.17 
ROA 3.43 5.44 20.05 
R&D/Assets 0.06 0.04 0.06 
PPE/#employees 86.15 49.91 130.33 
Revenue/#employees 276.75 220.66 217.10 
Cash/Assets 0.10 0.06 0.11 
Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.05 0.04 0.04 
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In Table 2, I have divided the companies into subsamples. Columns 1 and 2 introduce 
subsamples that are divided according to whether the firms have a profit sharing program or 
not. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 report subsamples that are divided according to whether the 
firms have health and safety concerns or not. I report the means of the variables separately to 
the two groups, and test the significance of the differences in mean values between the two 
subsamples using the two independent samples t-test (significance levels reported in columns 
1 and 3). Additionally, I test for the significance levels for the differences in median values with 
the Mann–Whitney U test (reported in columns 2 and 4). The results achieved give an indication 
of the upcoming OLS results, but with the limitation that the effects of control variables are 
excluded.  
When it comes to profit sharing (columns 1 and 2), the table reports a clear and significant 
difference in innovativeness between these two groups, as the average number of patents is 107 
among firms with no profit sharing program and 464 among those with one. Also the number 
of citations indicate that firms with profit sharing program are more innovative, as they have 
on average 4.4 times more citations than the firms with no profit sharing. The difference 
measured by patents/R&D (citations/R&D) is smaller, but still significant at on average 1.6 
times (2.2 times) more for firms with profit sharing. These results indicate that there may indeed 
be a positive effect of non-executive profit sharing on innovation.  
The mean differences for the control variables reported in columns 1-2 reveal separately the 
characteristics for the firms with and without profit sharing programs. Firms with profit sharing 
programs are bigger: they have on average 1.9 times more employees and 2.5 times more total 
assets. Companies with profit sharing generate more revenue scaled with the number of 
employees. Firms with profit sharing programs also seem to give out more executive 
compensation and engage in employee stock ownership or employee stock purchase plans. The 
tangible input to innovation (R&D/assets) is slightly higher among the firms with profit sharing. 
The difference of operating profitability (ROA) is significant only with mean values, but not 
with median values.  
Regarding health and safety concerns (columns 3 and 4), the differences in innovation measures 
are less clear. The average number of patents is 174 among firms with no health and safety 
concerns, and 168 among those with these concerns. The difference in patents is significant 
only with median values. Considering citations, the difference is significant with both mean 
and median values, and firms with no health and safety concerns have on average 1.4 times 
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more citations than firms facing these issues. Measuring innovation with patents/R&D gives no 
significant results in differences. With citations/R&D the difference is significant with mean 
values (but not with median values), and the variable is on average 1.6 times bigger for firms 
without health and safety concerns than for firms with health and safety concerns. These results 
give little evidence on the effect of health and safety concerns on corporate innovation.  
The mean differences for the control variables reported in columns 3-4 explain the 
characteristics for the firms with and without health and safety concerns. Those sample firms 
experiencing health and safety concerns are much bigger with on average 2.9 times more 
employees and 4.0 times more total assets. They also have a lower cash-to-assets ratio. A bit 
surprisingly, companies with health and safety concerns yield 1.5 times more revenue scaled 
with the number of employees than those without.  
Table 2: Subsample means 
The final data (described in Table 1) has been divided into two subsamples according to whether a firm has a profit 
sharing program or not, and the means for these separate samples are reported in columns 1 and 2. In columns 3 
and 4, the final data has been divided into two subsamples according to whether a firm has health and safety 
concerns or not, and the means for these separate samples are reported. In columns 1 and 3, the symbols ***, **, 
and * denote significance of the difference between the subsample means using the two independent samples t-
test (Welch's t-test) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In columns 2 and 4, the symbols ***, **, and * 
denote significance of the difference between the subsample medians using the Mann–Whitney U test at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
            
 Cash profit Cash profit  Health and Safety Health and Safety 
 Yes No  Concern Yes Concern No 
 n = 507 n = 2,179  n = 116 n = 2,570 
 Mean Mean  Mean Mean 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
            
Number of Patents 463.50*** 106.58*** 
 
168.26 174.21*** 
Number of Citations 6065.85*** 1385.72*** 
 
1609.62** 2298.90*** 
Patents/R&D 0.86*** 0.53*** 
 
0.52 0.60 
Citations/R&D 12.23*** 5.46*** 
 
4.20*** 6.85 
Profit Sharing 1*** 0*** 
 
0.26* 0.19 
Health and Safety Concerns 0.06* 0.04** 
 
1*** 0*** 
Employee Involvement 0.35*** 0.20*** 
 
0.23 0.23 
Assets 20594.62*** 8286.41*** 
 
37662.65*** 9388.59*** 
Revenue 15303.65*** 6212.25*** 
 
29787.47*** 6941.67*** 
Number of Employees 45.13*** 24.11*** 
 
75.04*** 25.96*** 
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Excecutive Compensation 6.12*** 5.00*** 
 
1.70*** 5.37*** 
ROA 5.44*** 2.97 
 
3.06 3.45*** 
R&D/Assets 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 
0.03*** 0.06*** 
PPE/#employees 109.44*** 80.74*** 
 
204.42*** 80.82*** 
Revenue/#employees 314.48*** 267.98*** 
 
411.23*** 270.68*** 
Cash/Assets 0.10 0.10 
 
0.04*** 0.11*** 
Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.06*** 0.05***   0.05 0.05*** 
 
4 Methodology and results 
 
4.1 Methodology 
 
I study the effects of profit sharing programs and health and safety concerns on corporate 
innovation using standard OLS regressions. To provide comparable results, my models rely 
strongly on the model used by Chang et al. (2015) to examine the effect of employee stock 
options on corporate innovation. 
The baseline models are as follows: 
(1)  Ln(1+Innovationi) = β0 + β1Profit Sharingi,t + β2Xi,t + β3Industryi,t + β4Yeart  
(2)  Ln(1+Innovationi) = β0 + β1Health and Safety Concernsi,t + β2Xi,t + β3Industryi,t 
+ β4Yeart  
Innovationi refers to the four innovation measures which I examine separately: patents, 
citations, patents/R&D expenses and citations/R&D expenses. Patents indicate the sum of 
patents of firm i in years t+1 and t+2. Citations indicate the sum of citations of firm i in years 
t+1 and t+2. Patents/R&D expenses (citations/R&D expenses) is the patents (citations) in years 
t+1 and t+2 scaled by the number of R&D expenses in year t. To reduce skewness in innovation 
measures, I use the logarithm of one plus these variables in the regression analysis. Xi,t includes 
the control variables discussed in Section 3.5 for firm i in year t. In model (1), the variable on 
health and safety concerns is interpreted as control variable, and similarly in model (2) profit 
sharing is defined as control variable. Industryi,t is the two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and 
Yeart is the year fixed effects.  
23 
 
4.2 Results from the baseline models 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the regressions on the baseline models. Considering equation (1), 
I find that profit sharing is positively and significantly correlated with all four innovation 
measures: Ln(1+Patents), Ln(1+Citations), Ln(1+Patents/R&D Expenses) and 
Ln(1+Citations/R&D Expenses) with t-statistics 5.2, 4.8, 4.2 and 4.8, respectively. The 
coefficients of profit sharing are 0.39, 0.50, 0.08 and 0.21 when regressing on patents, citations, 
patents/R&D expenses and citations/R&D expenses, respectively. For example, if a firm has 
no profit sharing and applies for 20 patents in two years (the sample median), the implementing 
of a profit sharing program would raise the number of patents with 49% according to these 
results.2 Of course in reality the change would not be that straightforward. Nevertheless, my 
results indicate a clear difference in innovation output for firms with and without profit sharing 
programs. These results add to the previous literature on non-executive incentives on 
innovation, such as the positive effect of an innovation bonus (Baccara and Razin, 2009), and 
employee stock options as a valid innovation incentive (Chang et al., 2015). My results are also 
in line with those of Aerts et al. (2015), who find that profit sharing fosters product innovation 
among German companies.  
The results for equation (2) for health and safety concerns are also significant with t-statistics -
4.0, -3.8, -1.9 and -3.1 and coefficients of -0.63, -0.73, -0.06 and -0.25 when regressing on 
patents, citations, patents/R&D expenses and citations/R&D expenses, respectively. The 
findings imply that if a firm without health and safety concerns applies for 20 patents in two 
years, the emergence of these problems would reduce the number of patents with 49%.2 Once 
again, the implication is not that simple, but the results indeed suggest that health and safety 
concerns have a negative effect on corporate innovation. My results add to the previous 
literature on employee health and safety which are linked with CSR and corporate culture, 
where the relationships with corporate innovation is highly understudied. However, e.g. 
Büschgens et al. (2013) and Baccara and Razin (2009) argue that the nature of corporate culture 
                                                          
2 The number one in Ln(1+Innovationi) makes the interpreting of the log-level model somewhat different from 
standard interpret. The exact percentage difference for profit sharing is calculated with the following formula 
(the same holds for health and safety concerns): 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 1 − (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠 + 1)
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠 + 1
= 𝑒𝛽1 − 1  
 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 − 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠
=
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠 + 1
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠
(𝑒𝛽1 − 1) , 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑠 > 0  
24 
 
affects innovation, which is in line with my results. Generally, there is a lack of previous studies 
of non-monetary incentives to innovate. 
Untabulated statistics reveal that Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is below 2.9 for all variables 
in all regressions, and therefore multicollinearity is not a problem in my sample. The adjusted 
R-squared is on average 0.51. The relatively high value is partly explained by fixed effects, as 
eliminating the industry and year fixed effects from the regressions decreases the average 
adjusted R-squared to 0.30.  
Table 3: Effects of profit sharing and health and safety concerns on corporate 
innovation 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. Patents is the sum of patents in years t+1 and t+2. Citations is the 
sum of patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using the weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). 
Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D 
expenses in year t. All following variables are reported in year t and in U.S. dollars, if applicable. Profit sharing 
tells if a given firm has a profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). Health and Safety Concerns tells if a 
given firm has experienced issues with health and safety (dummy variable). Employee Involvement tells if a given 
firm has generous employee stock ownership plans or employee stock purchase plans or neither (dummy variable). 
Revenue is the total net sales in millions. Number of Employees is reported in thousands. Executive Compensation 
is the sum of options and shares received by all directors in thousands. ROA is Return on Assets. R&D/Assets is 
the firm’s R&D expenses scaled by total assets. PPE/#employees is net Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) in 
millions scaled by the number of employees in thousands. Revenue/#employees is revenue scaled by the number 
of employees in thousands. Cash/Assets is cash-to-assets ratio. Capital Expenditures/Assets is capital expenditures 
scaled by total assets. Constant terms are included in the regressions but are not reported due to irrelevancy. In 
parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. The symbols ***, **, * and . 
denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
        
 
Ln(1+patents) Ln(1+citations) Ln(1+Patents/R&D) Ln(1+Citations/R&D) 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Profit Sharing 0.386*** 0.496*** 0.076*** 0.214*** 
 
(5.20) (4.80) (4.21) (4.76) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.627*** -0.730*** -0.057. -0.251** 
 
(-3.96) (-3.76) (-1.88) (-3.12) 
Ln(Revenue) 0.730*** 0.840*** 0.007 0.065*** 
 
(24.85) (20.80) (1.25) (4.49) 
Number of Employees 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.000** -0.001* 
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(4.22) (4.17) (-2.79) (-1.98) 
Excecutive Compensation 0.007. 0.007 -0.001 0.000 
 
(1.94) (1.28) (-2.07)* (0.10) 
Employee Involvement -0.026 -0.088 -0.075*** -0.154*** 
 
(-0.38) (-0.90) (-4.58) (-3.60) 
ROA 0.001 0.001 0.000*** 0.001* 
 
(0.47) (0.51) (4.07) (2.31) 
R&D/Assets 7.322*** 8.502*** *) *) 
 
(9.57) (8.19) 
  
Ln(PPE/#employees) 0.437*** 0.522*** 0.049*** 0.105** 
 
(7.93) (6.26) (3.67) (2.84) 
Ln(Revenue/#employees) -0.371*** -0.517*** -0.073*** -0.157*** 
 
(-5.17) (-5.03) (-4.54) (-3.84) 
Cash/Assets 0.756* 1.505*** -0.184** 0.080 
 
(2.44) (3.35) (-3.06) (0.53) 
Capital Expenditures/Assets 1.170 1.604 1.048** 2.578*** 
 
(1.30) (1.23) (3.23) (3.57) 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included 
     
N/adjusted R-squared 2,686/0.60 2,686/0.65 2,686/0.28 2,686/0.51 
  
*) R&D/Assets is excluded from these regressions to account for the issue that R&D is used in both dependent 
and independent variables.  
 
The coefficients of control variables are mostly in line with prior innovation literature. Larger 
firms clearly have more patents and citations when measured by total revenue, but when 
measured by the number of employees the coefficients are near zero. I discuss the meaning of 
the number of employees further in Section 5.3. I do not find a significant effect of return on 
assets or executive compensation on any of the corporate innovation measures. Unexpectedly, 
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employee involvement (employee stock ownership or purchase plans) has a negative effect on 
innovation when measured by patents and citations scaled by R&D expenses. I find a positive 
and significant effect of the cash-to-assets ratio on innovation when measured by patents and 
citations, and the level of capital expenditures (scaled by total assets) has a positive and 
significant effect on patents/R&D expenses and citations/R&D expenses. Capital intensity 
affects innovation positively, but surprisingly labour productivity seems to have a negative 
effect. I further address the impact of skilled labour in Section 5.2. As expected, larger R&D 
expenditures are strongly correlated with higher corporate innovation. The correlation is in fact 
so vivid, that in next section I introduce an alternative regression in which I use R&D expenses 
as innovation measure. 
4.3 Robust check with negative binomial regressions  
 
Patent and citation counts are non-negative and discrete, which makes it plausible to use 
negative binomial regressions instead of standard OLS regressions. Negative binomial 
regression is a generalization of Poisson regression, but it is more flexible as it does not require 
the response variable’s variance to be equal to its mean. I follow Chang et al. (2015) and test 
whether my models are robust to this alternative model specification. In negative binomial 
regressions, the dependent variables are the numbers of patents and citations and them scaled 
by R&D expenses, not their logarithmic values as in standard OLS regressions. 
The test results in Table 4 give similar results as in the previous section. Profit sharing is 
positively and significantly correlated with all four innovation measures: patents, citations, 
patents/R&D expenses and citations/R&D expenses with coefficients of 0.32, 0.26, 0.25 and 
0.22 and with t-statistics 4.8, 2.6, 3.7 and 3.0, respectively. Health and safety concerns are 
negatively and significantly correlated with all innovation measures used. T-statistics are -4.9, 
-4.8, -2.1 and -3.9 and the coefficients are -0.61, -0.87, -0.30 and -0.53 when regressing on 
patents, citations, patents/R&D expenses and citations/R&D expenses, respectively. The same 
control variables are included as in equations (1) and (2), but they are not tabulated for the sake 
of brevity. 
Table 4: Negative binomial regressions  
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. Patents is the sum of patents in years t+1 and t+2. Citations is the 
sum of patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using the weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). 
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Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D 
expenses in year t. Profit sharing tells if a given firm has a profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). Health 
and Safety Concerns tells if a given firm has experienced issues with health and safety (dummy variable). All 
regressions in this table include constant terms and the control variables used in Table 2, but the coefficients are 
not reported due to irrelevancy. In parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. 
The symbols ***, **, * and . denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Patents Citations Patents/R&D Citations/R&D 
  
NBG 
 
NBG 
 
NBG 
 
NBG 
 
Profit Sharing 0.322*** 0.257** 0.250*** 0.217** 
 
(4.77) (2.63) (3.73) (3.04) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.613*** -0.870*** -0.295* -0.530** 
  (-4.90) (-4.79) (-2.10) (-3.90) 
     
 
4.4 R&D as innovation measure approach 
 
Quantifying and measuring innovation is not all that simple. Are patents and patent citations 
really the best way to assess innovation? Smith (2005) argues that the main weakness of using 
patents to measure innovation is that they are an indicator of invention rather than innovation. 
Patents mark the emergence of new technical principles but miss all commercial innovations, 
which cannot be patented (e.g. new business strategies). In short, not all innovations are 
patented, but they can still be technologically and economically significant. 
Though Smith (2005) concludes in his final analysis that the patent system does have a striking 
advantage as an innovation measure since it gathers detailed information on inventive activity, 
I choose to do an additional regression with research and development expenses as the 
innovation measure. It may be seen as a valid measure for innovation, as investments in R&D 
lead to innovations and in most cases firms must invest in R&D in order to innovate in the first 
place. There is some empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that R&D expenses are a 
prompt proxy for innovation activities (e.g. Shefer and Frenkel, 2005). The obvious problem 
with R&D expenses is that it measures only input, missing the actual output entirely.  
The models with R&D Expenses as dependent variable are as follows: 
(3)  R&Di,t/Assetsi,t = β0 + β1Profit Sharingi,t + β2Xi,t + β3Industryi,t + β4Yeart  
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(4) R&Di,t/Assetsi,t = β0 + β1Health and Safety Concernsi,t + β2Xi,t + β3Industryi,t + 
β4Yeart  
The dependent variable refers to the R&D expenses in year t scaled by assets in year t. All 
independent variables are the same as in the baseline models (1) and (2), except R&D/assets 
which is of course excluded.  
Table 5 reports the results of the regression on equations (3) and (4). Interestingly, I find 
significant results for all control variables, but not for neither profit sharing nor health and safety 
concerns. According to the regression output, firms with profit sharing programs have a small 
positive impact on R&D expenses scaled by total assets, but the result is not significant with a 
p-value of 0.27. Health and safety concerns in turn have a slightly negative effect on the 
innovation measure, but again there is no significance with a p-value of 0.38. Thus I cannot 
find proof for H1 nor H2 when corporate innovation is measured by R&D expenses. However, 
as Scherer (1986) notes, there is no general correlation between R&D expenses and the 
importance of innovations produced, and therefore R&D expenses are not a very good measure 
of innovation. 
 
Table 5: Effect of profit sharing and health and safety concerns on R&D Expenses 
scaled by assets 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. R&D/Assets is the firm’s R&D expenses in year t scaled by total 
assets in year t. Profit sharing tells if a given firm has a profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). Health 
and Safety Concerns tells if a given firm has experienced issues with health and safety (dummy variable). 
Descriptions for the control variables can be found in Table 2. Constant term is included in the regressions but is 
not reported due to irrelevancy. In parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. 
The symbols ***, **, * and . denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
    
 R&D/Assets 
  
OLS 
 
Profit Sharing 0.003 
 
(1.10) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.003 
 
(-0.88) 
Ln(Revenue) -0.007*** 
29 
 
 
(-6.00) 
Number of Employees 0.000*** 
 
(3.38) 
Excecutive Compensation 0.001*** 
 
(5.42) 
Employee Involvement 0.014*** 
 
(6.14) 
ROA -0.000** 
 
(-3.15) 
Ln(PPE/#employees) -0.004* 
 
(-2.13) 
Ln(Revenue/#employees) 0.014*** 
 
(3.91) 
Cash/Assets 0.114*** 
 
(8.33) 
Capital Expenditures/Assets 0.227*** 
 
(6.40) 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects Included 
  
N/adjusted R-squared 2,686/0.39 
 
The median of the variable R&D/assets is only 0.04, which explains the small yet significant 
coefficients for the control variables. Notable is, that the effect of employee involvement is 
positive with a coefficient of 0.01, as opposed to the regressions in Table 3. This could imply 
that firms investing in employee involvement via stock ownership or purchase plans also invest 
more in R&D. The coefficient of total revenue is -0.01, indicating that larger firm size does not 
lead to more expenditure on R&D. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is below 2.9 for all 
variables, meaning that multicollinearity is not an issue in the setting. The adjusted R-squared 
of the model is 0.39.  
4.5 Endogeneity issues 
 
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 I find a positive correlation between profit sharing and corporate 
innovation, and a negative correlation between health and safety concerns and corporate 
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innovation. However, the results are possibly subject to two types of endogeneity: omitted 
variables and reverse causality. In both cases, the coefficient estimates from the OLS 
regressions would be biased and inconsistent. The possibility of endogeneity issues should be 
considered when interpreting my results.  
The omitted variable problem arises, if the models omit any variables that affect both profit 
sharing or health and safety concerns and corporate innovation. Despite the relatively large 
number of control variables in my regressions, there can still be a number of such variables. 
Some examples from prior innovation literature are firm growth, capital structure, firm age, 
corporate governance and stock return volatility. Also geographic clustering may matter as for 
example Audretsch and Feldman (1996) report that high-tech firms located in urban areas are 
more innovative than firms located in rural areas. All omitted variables are not easy to control 
for, as factors like supportive management and work atmosphere could be significant factors 
on innovation, the use of profit sharing and health and safety concerns.  
The other possible problem is reverse causality running from corporate innovation to profit 
sharing. While my results suggest that profit sharing spurs innovation, in reality the relation 
could be bidirectional, meaning that innovative firms tend to grant profit sharing programs. 
Aets et al. (2015) point out that firms with a profit sharing program probably attract 
performance oriented and cooperative workers, who presumably are more innovative. Ittner et 
al. (2003) argue that firms may use stock options to reward employees for their superior 
performance in past innovation activities. It could be easily alleged that the theory holds also 
for profit sharing, and that the purpose of profit sharing is to reward past activities rather than 
to foster future innovation. However, the two directions of causality are not mutually exclusive 
and may be at work simultaneously, meaning that despite the rewarding purpose profit sharing 
also incites future innovation.  
Reverse causality may also occur between corporate innovation and health and safety concerns. 
This would imply that firms that are more innovative tend to channel more resources in 
employees’ health and safety, so that issues covered in the variable do not occur. For example, 
Hong et al. (2012) find that financially constrained firms are less likely to spend resources on 
CSR. Financially constrained firms, in turn, are less likely to innovate (Savignac, 2008). In 
addition, health and safety concerns might suffer from measurement error because they are 
difficult to quantify given the qualitative nature of the concerns covered, as is the case in many 
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CSR-relates issues (Krüger 2015). In my sample also the small amount of firms facing health 
and safety concerns may lead to biased results. 
One way to address the endogeneity issues would be to identify and control for all the variables 
that have an influence on both corporate innovation and profit sharing or health and safety 
concerns. Of course, it is not plausible to get rid of all endogeneity this way, because there are 
countless factors that could affect both the dependent and independent variables. To mitigate 
any remaining endogeneity, it is common practice to use the instrumental variable approach. In 
my regressions, this instrumental variable should be correlated with health and safety concerns 
or the use of profit sharing programs but be unrelated to corporate innovation. Finding such 
instruments is however hard and time-consuming, and I leave the instrumental variable 
approach as something to be considered in future research.  
 
5 Further analysis 
 
I conduct some further analysis to better understand the channels through which profit sharing 
and health and safety affect corporate innovation. First I study in more detail firms that use a 
profit sharing scheme in some, but not in all, years. Then I follow Chang et al. (2015) and divide 
the sample in two ways to find out whether my results vary in different firms. Firstly, I examine 
if the effects of profit sharing and health and safety concerns on innovation are stronger in those 
firms, where the input of non-executive employees is more pronounced. Secondly, I estimate 
the impact of free-riding among employees.  
5.1 Firms with changing status of profit sharing 
 
I am interested to examine how, at firm-level, the taking into or out of use of profit sharing 
affects corporate innovation. Thus I conduct a subsample that includes all those firms that face 
a change in the value of profit sharing (dummy variable, 1 or 0). That is, the firm might not use 
profit sharing in earlier years but takes it into use later, or vice versa. The status of the use of 
profit sharing may also change back, for example if a firm first uses profit sharing, then stops 
using it, and then starts using it again. The subsample involves 58 firms and 412 firm-years. 
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Conducting a corresponding subsample with health and safety concerns ends up with only 26 
firms, making similar analysis impractical.  
Since the argument throughout this paper has been that profit sharing enhances innovation, I 
expect that the innovation outcome is higher for the subsample firms in those years, when profit 
sharing has been in use. As profit sharing is expected to be a valid incentive for corporate 
innovation, it should be that a firm has more innovation activity when it has a profit sharing 
program than when it has not. In this analysis the timing of innovation is crucial as the use of 
profit sharing is year-specific, and my choosing of measuring the number of patents and 
citations at years t+1 and t+2 can be criticised.  
I have calculated two means of the innovation measures (number of patents and citations, and 
them scaled with R&D expenses) for each firm in the subsample: means when profit sharing is 
in use, and means when profit sharing is not in use. Table 6 shows the means of all firm means, 
resulting in single values for all innovation measures when the profit sharing dummy is 1 and 
when it is 0. Unexpectedly, the number of patents is slightly larger and the number of citations 
is notably larger in those years when the firms do not have profit sharing. The relations are the 
same when patents and citations are scaled with R&D expenses. These results imply that in 
firms where the use of profit sharing has changed, innovation activity has been higher when 
there has not been a profit sharing program. However, after conducting the two independent 
samples t-test (Welch's t-test), it appears that the difference between the means is statistically 
significant only for Citations/R&D, with a p-value of 0.09. I conclude that there are no 
significant differences between the groups, meaning that a firm’s decision to implement a profit 
sharing scheme does not necessarily lead to enhanced innovation activity. 
The results can be affected from wrong timing of patents in my data, as I use patents that are 
applied for in years t+1 and t+2, when in reality the innovation process can be much longer than 
two years. Deciding the accurate time period to use in the regressions is difficult, since some 
patents may need years of work before they can be applied for, and some patents are contrived 
in just one year. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study of the average time of the 
innovation process. In previous innovation studies, the timing varies, and there is no general 
practice of in what years patents and citations should be measured. For example, Blanco and 
Wehrheim (2017) use year t, Chang et al. (2015) use year t+1 and He and Tian (2013) use year 
t+3 in their regressions.  
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Table 6: Means of changing value of profit sharing 
The sample consists of 58 firms and 412 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the 
NBER Patent and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. Profit sharing tells if a given firm has a profit sharing 
program or not (dummy variable). All the firms in the sample have experienced a change in the variable, so that 
in some year(s) the dummy variable has been 1, and in some year(s) 0. First is calculated separately for each firm 
the means of the innovation measures when Profit sharing is 0 and when it is 1. This table reports the means of 
the means when Profit sharing is 0 and when it is 1. Patents is the sum of the number of patents in years t+1 and 
t+2. Citations is the sum of the number of patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using the 
weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) in 
years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D expenses in millions in year t. 
          
Profit Sharing 
 
Patents 
 
Citations 
 
Patents/R&D 
 
Citations/R&D 
 
0 431.90 8486.69 0.92 14.19 
1 340.51 3800.83 0.76 7.96 
 
 
5.2 Importance of employees’ input in terms of innovation 
 
Skills and efforts of employees are essential factors of the innovation process, and Galia and 
Legros (2004) argue than one of the most important barriers to innovation is the lack of skilled 
personnel. I expect that the impacts of profit sharing and health and safety concerns on corporate 
innovation are more pronounced in firms, where the input of non-executive employees is 
relatively more important. I follow Chang et al. (2015) and use R&D expenses scaled by 
employees as a proxy for employee importance. Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014) state that labour 
and human capital play increasingly important roles in production, especially in R&D-intensive 
industries. Therefore per-employee R&D expenses should correlate highly with employee 
importance in innovation. Table 6 reports the mean, median and standard deviation of the new 
variable R&D expenses/1,000 employees in columns 1-3, respectively. An average firm in the 
sample uses 23.7 million R&D expenses per 1,000 employees, while the median is smaller at 
8.9 million.  
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Table 7: Summary statistics for employee importance 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. R&D expenses/1,000 employees is the firm’s R&D expenses in 
millions scaled by employees in thousands in year t. 
        
  Whole sample  
    
  n = 2,686  
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
R&D expenses/1,000 employees 23.70 8.88 40.66 
 
I use the new variable R&D expenses/1,000 employees to sort the sample into two subsamples: 
firms with R&D expenses scaled by employees in thousands above (below) the sample median 
to represent firms with high (low) employee importance. I then re-estimate equations (1) and 
(2) separately for the two groups.  
The results, reported in Table 8, show that the coefficients of profit sharing are highly positive 
and significant for firms with higher R&D per employee, while the coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero among firms with lower R&D per employee. The results 
indicate that the effect of profit sharing on innovation is indeed stronger in firms where 
employee inputs are more valued. For health and safety concerns, the coefficients are highly 
negative and significant only for firms with higher R&D per employee, while the coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero among firms with lower R&D per employee. This 
implies that the negative effect of health and safety concerns exists stronger in firms where 
employee inputs are more valued. 
Table 8: Differences of the effects of profit sharing and health and safety concerns on 
innovation based on employee importance 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. This table portions the sample into two subsamples based on 
employee importance, which is measured by R&D expenses/1,000 employees. Firms with R&D expenses per 1,000 
employees below (above) the sample median are classified as having low (high) employee importance. Patents is 
the sum of patents in years t+1 and t+2. Citations is the sum of patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is 
adjusted using the weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of 
patents (citations) in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D expenses in year t. Profit sharing tells if a given firm has a 
profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). Health and Safety Concerns tells if a given firm has experienced 
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issues with health and safety (dummy variable). All regressions in this table include constant terms and the control 
variables used in Table 2, but the coefficients are not reported due to irrelevancy. Nlow is 1,344 and Nhigh is 1,342. 
In parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. The symbols ***, **, * and . 
denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
          
 Ln(1+patents)  Ln(1+citations)  
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Profit sharing -0.096 0.525*** -0.048 0.543*** 
 
(-0.81) (5.68) (-0.28) (4.26) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.172 -1.226*** -0.255 -1.313*** 
 
(-1.01) (-4.10) (-1.10) (-3.82) 
     
 Ln(1+Patents/R&D) Ln(1+Citations/R&D) 
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Profit sharing -0.002 0.138*** 0.054 0.281*** 
 
(-0.05) (6.32) (0.72) (5.07) 
Health and Safety Concerns 0.002 -0.152*** -0.075 -0.502*** 
  (0.05) (-4.05) (-0.76) (-4.04) 
 
To test if the differences between the two groups (low and high employee importance) are 
statistically significant, I conduct additional regressions with interaction terms. I first generate 
a new dummy variable, which gets value 1 if the firm has high employee importance (R&D 
expenses per 1,000 employees is more than the median value 8.88), and value 0 if the firm has 
low employee importance (R&D expenses per 1,000 employees is less than 8.88). Then I create 
two interaction terms by multiplying the new dummy variable with the profit sharing and health 
and safety concern variables. The three new variables (dummy, dummy*profit sharing and 
dummy*health and safety concerns) are added to the baseline models (1) and (2). Now the 
interaction terms reveal whether there are true differences between the groups or not. The 
regression results in Table 9 show that coefficients of the interaction terms for both profit 
sharing and health and safety concerns are significant at least at the 1% level for all innovation 
measures, meaning that the differences found in Table 8 are significant.  
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Table 9: Significance of the differences of the effect of profit sharing and health and 
safety concerns on innovation between groups based on employee importance 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. Dummy is 1 (0) if the firm’s employee importance is high (low), 
meaning that R&D expenses/1,000 employees is above (below) the sample median. Profit Sharing tells if a given 
firm has a profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). Health and Safety Concerns tells if a given firm has 
experienced issues with health and safety (dummy variable). Dummy is multiplied with Profit Sharing and Health 
and Safety Concerns to conduct interaction terms: Profit Sharing*Dummy and Health and Safety 
Concerns*Dummy. The significances of the interaction terms indicate the significance of differences between the 
groups based on employee importance. Patents is the sum of patents in years t+1 and t+2. Citations is the sum of 
patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using the weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). Patents/R&D 
(Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D expenses in year 
t. All regressions in this table include constant terms and variables used in Table 2, but the coefficients are not 
reported due to irrelevancy. In parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. 
The symbols ***, **, * and . denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
          
 Ln(1+patents) Ln(1+citations) Ln(1+Patents/R&D) Ln(1+Citations/R&D) 
  
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
Dummy 0.529*** 0.768*** -0.080*** -0.041 
 
(5.35) (5.50) (-3.85) (-0.73) 
Health and Safety Concerns * 
Dummy -1.112*** -1.077** -0.203*** -0.537*** 
 
(-3.39) (-2.76) (-3.88) (-3.54) 
Profit Sharing * Dummy 0.764*** 0.765*** 0.160*** 0.267** 
  (4.90) (3.54) (4.11) (2.86) 
 
5.3 Employee free-riding  
 
Since profit sharing for non-executive employees reward them for joint performance 
improvements, free-riding caused by an individual employee’s incapability to affect the profit 
to be shared may hamper the positive incentive effect. Innovation results usually from 
teamwork, and with teamwork comes free-riding. Hochberg and Lindsey (2010) find that the 
power of the incentive effect of stock options can be diluted, if free-riding problems are severe 
among non-executive employees. I expect that also the impact of profit sharing on corporate 
innovation is more pronounced in firms, where the free-riding problems are less present. 
Hochberg and Lindsey (2010) point out that employees share the rewards with fewer colleagues 
in firms with fewer employees, which leads to reduction of the free-riding problem. Following 
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Chang et al. (2015), I use the number of employees as a proxy for the extent of free-riding. As 
reported in Table 1, the mean for the number of employees in the sample firms is 28,000 
employees and the median is 10,000 employees, making the firms in the sample relatively big.  
I also test how the effect of health and safety concerns changes between firms with different 
amounts of employees. I expect that in firms with less employees (less free-riding), the effect 
of these problems on corporate innovation is more severe. My argument is that in smaller work 
communities, the existence of health and safety concerns have a larger impact on individuals, 
since the issues come closer than in large communities. In firms with more employees, problems 
with health and safety might affect only a small part of the community, while the other 
employees do not feel concerned.  
I sort the sample into two subsamples based on the number of employees: firms with employees 
above (below) the sample median to represent firms with high (low) free-riding problems. I 
then re-estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for the two groups. The results are reported in 
Table 10. Additionally, I run regressions with interaction terms to find if the differences 
between the groups are statistically significant. I generate the two interaction terms by 
multiplying profit sharing and health and safety concern variables with a new dummy variable. 
The dummy variable gets value 1 if the firm has high employee free-riding (the number of 
employees is more than the median value 10,140), and value 0 if the firm has low employee 
free-riding (the number of employees is less than 10,140). The three new variables (dummy, 
dummy*profit sharing and dummy*health and safety concerns) are added to the baseline 
models (1) and (2). The regression results are reported in Table 11.  
In Table 10, the results for profit sharing show that the differences between the groups are as 
expected, but quite small. When using patents and citations as innovation measures, the 
coefficients of profit sharing are positive and significant for firms with less employees, and 
firms with more employees have slightly smaller coefficients. For patents/R&D and 
citations/R&D, the differences between the groups are very small. Nevertheless, Table 11 
reveals that the differences are not significant for any of the innovation measures, as the 
interaction term gets very small t-values in all regressions.  
The results for health and safety concerns in Table 10 are against my expectations. When 
corporate innovation is measured by patents and citations, the coefficients show a larger 
negative effect of health and safety concerns on innovation for firms with more employees, 
while the effect is not even significant for firms with less employees. For patents/R&D and 
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citations/R&D, the coefficients are more negative for firms with less employees, but the results 
are significant only for citations/R&D, and only at the 10% level. The small sample makes 
testing the differences between firms with different number of employees difficult. In fact, only 
12 firm observations among the firms with less employees are identified to have health and 
safety concerns. Table 11 confirms that there is no statistically significant difference between 
firms portioned by the number of employees, since the coefficients of the interaction term are 
not significant. I conclude that due to the small number of firms with health and safety concerns 
in my sample, testing the differences between these groups is ineffective.  
Because the two separate groups had small but non-significant differences in coefficients for 
profit sharing, I am interested to see how the results turn out with a more radical sorting. I thus 
sort the sample again by the number of employees: firms with employees below the lower 
quartile (3,300) to represent firms with low free-riding problems, and firms with employees 
above the upper quartile (29,200) to represent firms with high free-riding problems. This sorting 
cannot be done for health and safety concerns, since the number of firms with these issues is so 
small. The results, tabulated in Table 12, show even smaller differences between coefficients 
compared to Table 10. The results in Tables 10-12 conclude that, if the number of employees 
is a valid proxy for free-riding, I do not find evidence that the impact of profit sharing on 
innovation is more pronounced in firms with less free-riding. The results can be affected by the 
fact that all the firms in my sample are relatively big, possibly making the sorting by the number 
of employees ineffective.  
 
 
Table 10: Differences of the effects of profit sharing and health and safety concerns on 
innovation based on employee free-riding 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. This table portions the sample into two subsamples based on 
employee free-riding, which is measured by Number of employees. Firms with the number of employees below 
(above) the sample median are classified as having low (high) free-riding among employees. Patents is the sum of 
patents in years t+1 and t+2. Citations is the sum of patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using 
the weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). Patents/R&D (Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) 
in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D expenses in year t. Profit sharing tells if a given firm has a profit sharing 
program or not (dummy variable). Health and Safety Concerns tells if a given firm has experienced issues with 
health and safety (dummy variable). All regressions in this table include constant terms and the control variables 
used in Table 2, but the coefficients are not reported due to irrelevancy. Nlow is 1,343 and Nhigh is 1,343. In 
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parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. The symbols ***, **, * and . 
denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
          
 Ln(1+patents)  Ln(1+citations)  
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Profit Sharing 0.541*** 0.320** 0.663*** 0.386** 
 
(5.39) (3.03) (4.32) (2.72) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.158 -0.637*** -0.297 -0.728*** 
 
(-0.40) (-3.82) (-0.52) (-3.61) 
     
 Ln(1+Patents/R&D) Ln(1+Citations/R&D) 
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Profit Sharing 0.078** 0.095*** 0.230** 0.213*** 
 
(2.88) (3.70) (3.29) (3.56) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.115 -0.052 -0.420* -0.213* 
  (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.97) (-2.35) 
 
Table 11: Significance of the differences of the effect of profit sharing and health and 
safety concerns on innovation between groups based on employee free-riding 
The sample consists of 2,686 firm-years jointly covered in the MSCI Database, Compustat and the NBER Patent 
and Citation Database between 1995 and 2003. Dummy is 1 (0) if the firm’s employee free-riding is high (low), 
meaning that the Number of employees is above (below) the sample median. Profit Sharing tells if a given firm 
has a profit sharing program or not (dummy variable). Health and Safety Concerns tells if a given firm has 
experienced issues with health and safety (dummy variable). Dummy is multiplied with Profit Sharing and Health 
and Safety Concerns to conduct interaction terms: Profit Sharing*Dummy and Health and Safety 
Concerns*Dummy. The significances of the interaction terms indicate the significance of differences between the 
groups based on employee free-riding. Patents is the sum of patents in years t+1 and t+2. Citations is the sum of 
patent citations in years t+1 and t+2, which is adjusted using the weighting index of Hall et al. (2005). Patents/R&D 
(Citations/R&D) is the firm’s number of patents (citations) in years t+1 and t+2 scaled by R&D expenses in year 
t. All regressions in this table include constant terms and variables used in Table 2, but the coefficients are not 
reported due to irrelevancy. In parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using robust standard errors. 
The symbols ***, **, * and . denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
          
 Ln(1+patents) Ln(1+citations) Ln(1+Patents/R&D) Ln(1+Citations/R&D) 
  
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
OLS 
 
Dummy 0.420*** 0.479** 0.083** 0.150* 
 
(4.06) (3.27) (-3.27) (2.36) 
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Health and Safety Concerns * 
Dummy -0.362 -0.376 0.020 0.045 
 
(-0.85) (-0.63) (0.24) (0.21) 
Profit Sharing * Dummy 0.114 0.166 0.044 0.082 
  (0.80) (0.84) (1.31) (0.89) 
 
Table 12: Differences of the effect of profit sharing on innovation and health and safety 
concerns based on employee free-riding, portioning by the lower and upper quartile 
The description in the legend of Table 10 holds in this table, except for the sample size (now 1,343) and the 
dividing of the two subsamples. Here firms with the number of employees below the lower quartile (3,300) are 
classified as having low free-riding among employees. Similarly, firms with the number of employees above the 
upper quartile (29,200) are classified as having high free-riding among employees. Nlow is 672 and Nhigh is 671. In 
parentheses are the t-statistics, which are calculated using the Huber-White heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors. The symbols ***, **, * and . denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
          
 Ln(1+patents)  Ln(1+citations)  
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Profit Sharing 0.457** 0.364** 0.662** 0.527** 
 
(3.24) (2.71) (2.91) (2.87) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.521 -0.588** -0.531 -0.628* 
 
(-1.63) (-2.83) (-1.11) (-2.50) 
     
 Ln(1+Patents/R&D) Ln(1+Citations/R&D) 
  
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Profit Sharing 0.077* 0.095*** 0.276** 0.278*** 
 
(2.15) (3.73) (2.74) (3.91) 
Health and Safety Concerns -0.065 -0.075* -0.186 -0.249* 
  (-1.35) (-2.47) (-1.03) (-2.56) 
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6 Conclusion 
 
Innovation has become a key strategy to enhance firm growth in the current millennium. Thus 
employing an effective incentive scheme to spur corporate innovation has become one of the 
greatest concerns in companies. While most of the previous literature on the factors that incite 
innovation has considered executive and financial incentives, this novel study contributes to the 
literature of non-executive and non-financial incentives. In this thesis, I have studied the effect 
of cash profit sharing programs and health and safety concerns on corporate innovation, using 
a sample of U.S. firms jointly covered in the NBER Patent and Citation Database, MSCI ESG 
KLD STATS database and Compustat between 1995 and 2003. The final sample consisted of 
2,686 firm-years. I captured the use of profit sharing and the problems with health and safety 
with dummy variables. Corporate innovation was measured with patents, citations, and them 
scaled with R&D expenses. I also introduced a number of control variables, including firm size, 
executive compensation and capital expenditures.  
I compared the sample firms by dividing them into two subsamples, and documented a clear 
difference in innovativeness between companies with and without a profit sharing program. For 
health and safe concerns, the differences were not as pronounced between the two subsamples. 
I then run OLS regressions, and found a positive and significant effect of profit sharing on 
corporate innovation. I also showed a negative and significant effect of health and safety 
concerns on corporate innovation. The results were robust to the use of negative binomial 
regressions, but not to the use of R&D expenses as innovation measure. With further analysis I 
found that the positive effect of profit sharing programs and the negative effect of health and 
safety concerns on innovation are more pronounced in firms where employees' input to 
innovation is more important. However, inconsistent with Chang et. al (2015), I concluded that 
in firms with a less severe free-riding problem among employees the effects of profit sharing 
and health and safety concerns on corporate innovation are not more prevalent. I also tested 
how profit sharing affects innovation in firms where the use of profit sharing programs has 
changed, and did not find that the firms would have had more innovation activity in those years 
when profit sharing was in use. 
Kruse (1996) states that one of the main reasons why companies would implement profit 
sharing is to boost workplace productivity and co-operation. Asongu (2007) acknowledges that 
in addition to profitability, CSR creates opportunities for enhanced corporate innovation. My 
regression results establish concrete proof for these arguments. The results suggest that profit 
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sharing adds to companies’ innovative capacity, which should encourage more firms to adapt 
profit sharing as a rewarding system to their employees. My results for health and safety 
concerns imply that to improve innovation, a firm should use resources to enhance CSR so that 
severe problems with health and safety can be avoided. My findings also emphasize the role of 
non-executive employees as important innovators in firms, and thus enrich the stakeholder 
theory of corporate finance. 
My results may be exposed to endogeneity issues which could lead the results to be biased and 
inconsistent. The two types of possible endogeneity concerns are omitted variables and reverse 
causality. Addressing these issues by obtaining more control variables and using the 
instrumental variable approach would be a sufficient topic for further research. Also, as my 
results are based on data from the U.S., it could be interesting to examine if the results hold in 
other countries. 
The theme of valid incentives to spur corporate innovation still has a lot of issues to be 
examined. Rudis reported already in 2004 that one of the main concerns of CEOs is how to 
stimulate innovation and creativity among employees. It is plausible that the question raises 
even more interest in the coming years, as the importance of innovation gets increasing 
attention. For example, the massive coming of start-up companies has also made the traditional 
firms to realise that innovation is crucial to keep up with competitors. Especially the role of 
non-executive employees as company innovators is still an underexplored topic, and leaves 
many suggestions for future research. The same holds for non-monetary incentives, which I 
believe have a significant impact on non-routine work like innovation. What is the role of for 
example work atmosphere, supportive management and flexible work schedules? It could easily 
be argued that employees who enjoy their work place are also more active in pursuing 
innovation. 
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